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Abstract
In recent years, the European Commission has given increased room for stake-
holder involvement in the area of insolvency and restructuring. In revising the Eu-
ropean Insolvency Regulation in 2012–2015 and preparing the proposal for a
directive on preventive restructuring frameworks 2016, the role and direct inﬂu-
ence of stakeholders has been noteworthy. In these efforts, the Commission touched
upon a ﬁeld of law characterised by diverse stakeholders with strongly opposing in-
terests. Following the active involvement of all stakeholders by the Commission, this
study examines what relevant stakeholders are, what their positions are with respect
to European Union insolvency legislation and what their role has been and can be
in legislative processes in the area of insolvency and restructuring. Copyright ©
2018 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
I. Introduction
Since the 2011 call of the European Parliament for legislative measures with re-
gard to insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company law,1 reform of in-
solvency regimes has been prominent on academic and legislative agendas.2 In
subsequent efforts, the Commission acted in a largely untapped area of
harmonising substantive insolvency law. A ﬁeld of law characterised by diverse
stakeholders with strongly opposing interests, including, among others, the debtor,
the debtor’s management, shareholders, employees, ﬁnanciers, secured and
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†For this chapter, the developments with regard to
harmonisation of European insolvency law have been
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2011 with recommendations to the Commission on in-
solvency proceedings in the context of EU company
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vency Law in Europe (Reports presented to the
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unsecured creditors and tax authorities. In its approach, the Commission actively
involved all these stakeholders.
This article will discuss, what the author will call, the integrated stakeholder ap-
proach that the Commission pursues in harmonising European insolvency regimes.
Both in its revision of the European Insolvency Regulation (2000)3 (EIR 2000) and
in its work on a proposal for a directive on preventive restructuring frameworks;
second chance and measures to increase the efﬁciency of restructuring; and insol-
vency and discharge procedures (‘Restructuring Directive’),4 the role and direct in-
ﬂuence of stakeholders is noteworthy. The questions in this article concern what is
a relevant ‘stakeholder’, why is the Commission involving them and whether – and
under which conditions – it is justiﬁed to involve stakeholders in designing and ex-
ecution of EU insolvency legislation.
This article is organised as follows. Section II will introduce the topic of stake-
holders in insolvency and will elaborate on some theories regarding stakeholders.
A technique will be proposed to distinguish and rank different types of stakeholders
based on their salience. Subsequently, in Section III, this approach will be applied
to deﬁne stakeholders in the ﬁeld of insolvency legislation. In Section IV, the sen-
sibility of stakeholder involvement will be discussed by reviewing how the role of
stakeholders in insolvency law has evolved over time. Then, in Section V, the ap-
proach of the European Commission toward harmonising substantive insolvency
and stakeholders will be discussed. Section VI will turn to the sentiments of differ-
ent stakeholders on harmonisation. This will be followed by some recommenda-
tions to pursue, with the involvement of stakeholders, the Commissions’ aim of
harmonising certain aspects of national insolvency regimes (Section VII). Finally,
Section VII draws some conclusions.
II. Exploration of the Stakeholder
The relevance of stakeholder involvement in the ﬁeld of insolvency was advocated
by, for example, EU Commissioner Věra Jourová. The EU Commissioner for Jus-
tice, Consumers and Gender Equality touched upon this in her speech of 16 June
2016 held at the occasion of the 5th European insolvency and restructuring con-
gress where she spoke on the harmonisation process of European insolvency law.
The EU Commissioner emphasised the important role of practitioners and judges
to bring legislation alive and bring forward the beneﬁts of legislation to the whole
of the internal market. But their involvement is also required in designing new leg-
islation. In particular, in drafting the new legislative instrument on substantive in-
solvency law, EU Commissioner Věra Jourová stated:
3. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May
2000 on insolvency proceedings (‘EIR 2000’) was re-
vised by the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2015/848
of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast)
(‘EIR 2015’).
4. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of
the European Union and the Council on preventive
restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures
to increase the efﬁciency of restructuring, insolvency
and discharge procedures and amending Directive
2012/30/EU of 22 November 2016, COM(2016)
723 ﬁnal (‘Restructuring Directive’).
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It will build on the 2014 Recommendation and designed based on the input receive[d]
from all concerned stakeholders, including you the practitioners, and from other Mem-
ber States experts. We’ll duly consider such input also in order to assess the state of play
on consumer insolvency and whether action is needed in this regard.5
Furthermore, more recently, the Commissioner said:
In our preparatory work, we paid attention to the opinions of all stakeholders, including
national parliaments.6
These quotes illustrate and emphasise the importance the Commission has at-
tached to involve all stakeholders in its insolvency endeavour. At the same time, it
is left open what these ‘stakeholders’ are. Although the Commissioner refers to,
among others, insolvency practitioners, national parliaments andMember State ex-
perts, this seems a non-exhaustive list of stakeholders and leaves much room for in-
terpretation. But also, what role do these stakeholders fulﬁl; are they a sounding
board for the Commission’s policies or even a strategic partner for new legislation?
A. Stakeholders and corporate governance
In the ﬁeld of business administration and corporate governance, research has been
conducted on what stakeholders are, how different stakeholders can be distinguished
and how the interests of different stakeholder should be prioritised. The line of ap-
proach taken here is built, in particular, around the well-known divide7 between the
shareholder primacy (corresponding to the agency theory8) and the (non-shareholder)
stakeholder perspective and the alternative of the enlightened shareholder value.9
5. Speech by Commissioner Jourová at 5th European
Insolvency and Restructuring Congress, Brussels (16
June 2016), available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/com-
mission/2014-2019/jourova/announcements/speech-
commissioner-jourova-5th-european-insolvency-and-
restructuring-congress_en>.
6. Speech by Commissioner Jourová to the Legal Af-
fairs Committee and EU Affairs Committee in the
Bundestag: Anti-Money Laundering, European Public
Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce, Digital Contracts and Insolvency
(26 September 2016), SPEECH/16/3189, available
at: <http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-16-3189_en.htm>.
7. See David Millon, ‘Radical Shareholder Primacy’
(2013) 12(4) University of St. Thomas Law Journal 1013.
Millon describes two types of shareholder primacy, (i)
the radical shareholder primacy where directors are fully
focused on serving the shareholders’ interests and (ii) the
traditional shareholder primacy, where directors con-
sider interests of shareholders and (where appropriate)
that of non-shareholders. Vasudev and Watson refer to
this divide as the ‘Great Debate’: P.M. Vasudev and
Susan Watson (eds), Corporate Governance after the Financial
Crisis (2012, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham), 6. See also
Jonathon Strom, ‘The Rebirth of HeroicManagerialism’
(2015–2016) 3 Bus. & Bankr. L. J. 67, 69 et seq.
8. Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial
Economics 305.
9. The enlightened shareholder value (ESV) is based
on shareholder primacy but advocates long-term proﬁt
and incorporates interests of shareholders and other
stakeholders. For example, see David Millon, ‘Enlight-
ened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, and the
Redeﬁnition of Corporate Purpose without Law’
(Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2010–
11), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1 625 750>; Virginia Harper Ho, ‘“Enlightened
Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond
the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide’ (2010) 36(1) Jour-
nal of Corporation Law 59. For a review of 10 years of
ESV, as incorporated in the UK Company Act, see
Sabrina Bruno, ‘The “Enlightened Shareholder
Value” in UK Companies Ten Years Later: What
the European Directive N. 2014/95/EC Can Do’ in
Anne Dorsman et al. (eds), Le Droit Comparé des Affaires
au XXIéme siècle (Mélanges à la mémoire de Claude
Ducoloux-Favard) (Larcier, 2017) (315–327). Further-
more, Baumﬁeld argues that stakeholder theory, as
conceived by management theorists, is largely in line
with ESV and does not conﬂict with shareholder
wealth maximisation: Victoria Baumﬁeld, ‘Stakeholder
Theory from a Management Perspective: Bridging the
Shareholder/Stakeholder Divide’ (2016) 31 Australian
Journal of Corporate Law 187.
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In 2014, the Commission published a proposal to revise two directives on en-
couraging long-term shareholder engagement and corporate governance.10 Here,
they promote the involvement of both shareholders and other stakeholders in a
company. The European Parliament, in response, took this a step further and
suggested to include the position of all stakeholders of the company (‘EP Amend-
ment’).11 Regarding shareholders, the text should explicitly state (emphasis
added):
(2) Although they do not own corporations, which are separate legal entities beyond
their full control, shareholders play a relevant role in the governance of those
corporations.
[…] (2a) Greater involvement of shareholders in companies’ corporate governance
is one of the levers that can help improve the ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial perfor-
mance of those companies. Nevertheless, since shareholder rights are not the only
long-term factor which needs to be taken into consideration in corporate gover-
nance, they should be accompanied by additional measures to ensure a greater in-
volvement of all stakeholders, in particular employees, local authorities and civil
society.12
With this proposal, the European Parliament declines, more explicitly than the
Commission did, the shareholder primacy perspective, as shareholders are no lon-
ger regarded as the owners of companies. However, in the subsequent steps of the
legislative process, these amendments were not included. In the ﬁnal text as
adopted in the Directive, it was, however, reiterated not only that greater share-
holder involvement can play a role in improving (non-)ﬁnancial performance of
a company but also that it is important to involve other stakeholders in corporate
governance.13 The EP Amendment and the ﬁnal text of the Directive do not pro-
vide for a deﬁnition of what corporate governance is in this context. However,
there are numerous deﬁnitions available. See, for example, the well-known 1992
Cadbury Report on Corporate Governance, which states:
Corporate Governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled.14
10. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive
of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the
encouragement of long-term shareholder engage-
ment and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards cer-
tain elements of the corporate governance
statement, 9 April 2014, 2014/0121 (COD). Both
the directives themselves and this proposal hardly
touch upon the position of stakeholders other than
shareholders.
11. European Parliament, Amendments adopted by
the European Parliament on 8 July 2015 on the pro-
posal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as
regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder
engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards
certain elements of the corporate governance
statement (COM(2014)0213–C7–0147/2014–2014/
0121(COD)) (Ordinary legislative procedure: ﬁrst
reading), P8_TA(2015)0257.
12. Ibid., (2). See also Jean-Jacques Du Plessis, ‘Corpo-
rate Governance, Corporate Responsibility and Law:
Shareholder Primacy and Other Stakeholder Interests’
(2016) 34(8) Company and Securities Law Journal 238.
13. See Directive (EU) 2017/828 of 17 May 2017
amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the en-
couragement of long-term shareholder engagement,
Recitals 2, 14 and 16. With still a central role for the
shareholder, this Directive seems to apply the afore-
mentioned ESV approach.
14. Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects
of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report) (1992),
paragraph 2.5, available at: <http://cadbury.cjbs.
archios.info/report>.
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The Cadbury Report applies a functional and abstract approach to deﬁne cor-
porate governance. It focuses on the company’s structure. Another respected def-
inition is that of the G20/OECD, which also includes a relational perspective by
incorporating the role of stakeholders in corporate governance:
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s man-
agement, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate Governance
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set,
and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are
determined.15
From the aforementioned G20/OECD deﬁnition, it can be observed that cor-
porate governance does not relate only to internal but also to external stake-
holders. It also recognises their importance in both setting and achieving
company objectives. As such, this deﬁnition seems effective in explaining the role
in a company’s corporate governance and can be guidance to analysing gover-
nance in the context of a legislative process.
B. Deﬁning stakeholders
The G20/OECD report provides a useful deﬁnition of corporate governance
but leaves it open what stakeholders are. Here, we can return to the EP
Amendment, as various suggestions are proposed to promote that, besides the
interests of shareholders,16 also interests of other stakeholders are kept by a
company.17 Interestingly, the EP Amendment proposes a deﬁnition of a
company’s stakeholders (in particular employees, local authorities and civil soci-
ety),18 which reads as follows:
any individual, group, organisation or local community that is affected by or otherwise
has an interest in the operation and performance of a company.19
15. G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
(2015), 9, available at:<https://www.oecd.org/corpo-
rate/principles-corporate-governance.htm>. For a
more extensive review of some deﬁnitions of corporate
governance, see Bernard Santen,On the Role of Monitoring
near Financial Distress (2011, diss.), paragraphs 3.2.2–3.6.
16. Shareholder is deﬁned as: ‘the natural or legal person that
is recognised as a shareholder under the applicable law’: Directive
2007/36/EC of 11 July 1997 on the exercise of certain
rights of shareholders in listed companies, Article 2(b).
17. Ibid., inter aliaRecitals (8), (10), (18); Article 3 h(2)(d).
18. For civil society, no deﬁnition is provided by the Eu-
ropean Parliament in this proposal, nor who will repre-
sent these interests (to the company). The United
Nations regards ‘civil society’ as the third sector, besides
the government and business, comprising the whole of
non-governmental and not-for-proﬁt organisations, see
United Nations, Civil Society (2016), available at:
<www.un.org/en/sections/resources/civil-society>.
The World Bank deﬁnes civil society as follows: ‘the
wide array of non-governmental and not-for-proﬁt or-
ganizations that have a presence in public life,
expressing the interests and values of their members or
others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientiﬁc, re-
ligious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society
Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array
of organizations: community groups, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous
groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organiza-
tions, professional associations, and foundations’: World
Bank, Deﬁning Civil Society (2016), available at: <http://
go.worldbank.org/4CE7W046K0>.
19. European Parliament, Amendments adopted by
the European Parliament on 8 July 2015 on the pro-
posal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as
regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder
engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards
certain elements of the corporate governance state-
ment (COM(2014)0213–C7–0147/2014–2014/
0121(COD)) (Ordinary legislative procedure: ﬁrst
reading), P8_TA(2015)0257, Article 1(2)(jb). This deﬁ-
nition was not included in the ﬁnal text of the adopted
Directive (EU) 2017/828.
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Various other deﬁnitions of ‘stakeholder’ can be found in academic literature.20
Parliament’s deﬁnition seems in line with Freeman’s perspective of stakeholders of
1984, although he takes a stronger emphasis on the companies’ strategy and
purpose:
A stakeholder in an organization is (by deﬁnition) all of those groups and individuals,
that can affect, or are affected by, the accomplishment of organizational purpose.21
A more invasive perspective on stakeholders is proposed by Savage, Nix, White-
head and Blair (1991), as they deﬁne stakeholders as follows:
Stakeholders include those individuals, groups, and other organizations who have an in-
terest in the actions of an organization and who have the ability to inﬂuence it.22
According to Savage et al., stakeholders need to have both (i) an interest in the
actions of an organisation, which arguably is present when an organisation’s ac-
tions affect these interests, and (ii) be able to inﬂuence the organisation. This is a
more stringent deﬁnition compared with the deﬁnitions of the European Parlia-
ment and Freeman, where either (i) or (ii) would sufﬁce to qualify as stakeholder.
In light of the previous text, there would in general be two (not mutually exclusive)
types of stakeholders from the perspective of the legislative ‘business’ of the Euro-
pean Commission on insolvency law: (i) all those individuals and groups that can af-
fect the drafting process of a legislative measure on insolvency law, in particular the
Council, the Parliament and the Member States and (ii) all those individuals and
groups that are affected by a legislative measure on insolvency. This could include,
among others, companies, employees, insolvency practitioners and judges. In its
current insolvency endeavour, the Commission provides, in particular, these latter
stakeholders with a strong but informal inﬂuence on the legislative process that
therefore fall within the scope of stakeholders as deﬁned by Savage et al. (1991).
C. Distinguishing and ranking of stakeholders
With a broad perspective on stakeholders, the inequality of interests makes it hard
to compare the various stakeholders involved in insolvency. To distinguish ‘who
and what really counts’, Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) have developed an ap-
proach based on salience. They propose that those interests that have the highest
20. Some prime deﬁnitions of stakeholder have been
provided in this article. However, as has been rightly
observed by Samantha Miles, there are numerous def-
initions and consensus on the concept of ‘Stakeholder’.
She even concludes that we could speak of ‘stake-
holder’ as an essentially contested concept, see
Samantha Miles, ‘Stakeholder: Essentially Contested
or Just Confused?’ (2012) 108(3) Journal of Business Ethics
285. For an overview of some 27 deﬁnitions of ‘stake-
holder’, see Ronald Mitchell, Bradley Agle and Donna
Wood, ‘Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identiﬁca-
tion and Salience: Deﬁning the Principle of who and
what really counts’ (1997) 22(4) Academy of Management
Review 853, 858.
21. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder
Approach (Pitman, 1984), 25.
22. Grant Savage et al., ‘Strategies for Assessing and
Managing Organizational Stakeholders’ (1991) 5(2)
Academy of Management Executive 61. They further dis-
tinguish between (i) primary stakeholders as the ones
that have a direct and necessary economic impact on
the organisation and (ii) secondary stakeholders as
the ones that are only indirectly part of the
company’s business, but that can inﬂuence the com-
pany. To review the different stakeholders, two di-
mensions are proposed: (i) the potential threat they
represent and (ii) the potential to cooperate with
these stakeholders.
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salience are the interests that should be given the most priority. Salience should be
evaluated on three attributes, namely, (i) power, (ii) legitimacy and (iii) urgency:23
i Power relates to the possibility that someone can impose his will in a relationship upon
(an) other(s). There can be a legal foundation to this power.24
ii Legitimacy relates to the (social) desirability of the interest (and accompanying behav-
iour) of a stakeholder as shared by others.25
iii Urgency relates to whether or not ‘time is of the essence’ for the interests at hand and
whether compelling action is required.26
The combination of these three attributes results in eight different types of stake-
holders (Figure 1).27
Mitchell, Agle and Wood propose the following typology of stakeholders:
1 Dormant stakeholder;
2 Discretionary stakeholder;
3 Demanding stakeholder;
4 Dominant stakeholder;
5 Dangerous stakeholder;
6 Dependent stakeholder;
7 Deﬁnitive stakeholder;
8 The non-stakeholder.
The more attributes a stakeholder possesses, the more priority should be given
to a stakeholder. Besides 8 (the non-stakeholder), 1–3 (dormant, discretionary
23. Mitchell et al., previous note 20, 853–854.
24. Ibid., 853, 865–866.
25. Ibid., 866–867.
26. Ibid., 867–868.
27. Ibid., 872.
Figure 1. Qualitative classes of stakeholders. Source: Mitchell, Agle and Wood.
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and demanding stakeholders) would receive the least attention, 4–6 (dominant,
dangerous and dependent stakeholders) much more and 7 (deﬁnitive stakeholders)
most attention. Applying this framework will be useful in distinguishing between
various interests. At the same time, it leaves some room for subjectivity, for
example, on whether or not a broad or narrow view is applied in recognising
power, legitimacy and/or urgency of speciﬁc interests of stakeholders.28
D. Conclusion
The aforementioned showed the interrelatedness between a governance model
and the involvement of stakeholders. This was illustrated with the perspectives of
the Commission and the European Parliament. In the area of corporate gover-
nance, various deﬁnitions of stakeholders have been developed, in this section,
the deﬁnition of Savage et al. (1991) was adopted, which requires stakeholders to
have an interest in the organisations’ action and be able to inﬂuence these actions:
Stakeholders include those individuals, groups, and other organizations who have an in-
terest in the actions of an organization and who have the ability to inﬂuence it.29
These perspectives on corporate governance can also be used to analyse the
governance of a legislative process. EU Commissioner Věra Jourová pointed out
the importance of involving all stakeholders in its current endeavour on the
harmonisation of substantial insolvency law, thereby advocating a stakeholder per-
spective on legislative governance. It remains, however, undecided who these
stakeholders are and what their role should be in this legislative process. The afore-
mentioned framework provides a qualitative tool for the evaluation of who possible
stakeholders are and what their position is compared with other stakeholders.
Where, following the Commission’s approach, besides legislative parties (such as
the European Parliament, Council and Member States), other parties are also
recognised as stakeholders (e.g. employees and civil society), an approach based
on salience of interests may be effective in prioritising the different stakeholders.
This differentiation can be based on three attributes: (i) power, (ii) legitimacy
and (iii) urgency. The more attributes a stakeholder possesses, the more important
its interests are. This forms a starting point in distinguishing between the many
conﬂicting interests involved in legislative processes.
III. Stakeholders in Insolvency and Restructuring
As mentioned before, governance also plays a key role where it concerns the extent
to which internal and external stakeholders are involved in a legislative process,
which in this article will be referred to as ‘legislative governance’. Where it
28. Ibid., 856.
29. Savage et al., previous note 22, 61, further
distinguishing between (i) primary stakeholders as the
ones that have a direct and necessary economic impact
on the organisation and (ii) secondary stakeholders as
the ones that are only indirectly part of the companies’
business, but that can inﬂuence the company. To re-
view the different stakeholders, two dimensions are
proposed: (i) the potential threat they represent and
(ii) the potential to cooperate with these stakeholders.
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concerns the legislative efforts of the Commission on harmonising insolvency and
restructuring laws, stakeholders can be deﬁned based on the deﬁnition of Savage
et al. (1991), as follows:
Stakeholders are all those individuals, groups and other organisations that have an in-
terest in the EU legislative process of harmonising insolvency and restructuring law
and which have the ability to inﬂuence the choices and decisions the Commission has
to make.
The ability to inﬂuence the legislative process is presumed present for all indi-
viduals, groups and other organisations that have taken (actively) part in any of
the activities that the Commission has employed, as will be elaborated in
Section VI, and represent interests that are affected by insolvency and
restructuring proceedings. For legislative governance, in particular ‘power’ and ‘le-
gitimacy’ are important attributes, as described by Mitchell et al. (1997), for stake-
holders to affect legislation. For the attribute ‘urgency’, this is different. Urgency
will in the course of a legislative process not be an attribute likely present with
stakeholders in general. Therefore, in the area of on insolvency and restructuring
proceedings, a distinction can be made between three types of stakeholders with
the following non-exhaustive overview of stakeholders.
A. Dominant stakeholders (attributes: power and legitimacy)
Stakeholders for whom power is based on a statutory provision include
• European Parliament;
• European Council;
• Member States.
Power can also be based on the direct involvement and central role played by
certain stakeholders in realising a successful restructuring:
• Banks and other institutional investors;
• Non-institutional investors;
• Secured creditors.
B. Discretionary stakeholder (attribute: legitimacy)
Legitimacy for various stakeholders is based on their direct involvement in insol-
vency and restructuring proceedings, as is the case for
• Debtors;*
• Shareholders;*
• Trade creditors;
• Employees;
• Tax authorities;*
• Judiciary;*
• Practitioners (insolvency practitioners,* mediators, supervisors, CROs, turnaround
professionals).
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* While these stakeholders have no statutory power to draft legislation, they can, based
on different grounds, have some informal power due to their direct involvement on in-
solvency and restructuring proceedings.
For other stakeholders, legitimacy is based on the indirect involvement in insol-
vency and restructuring proceedings, as their involvement is professional or based
on representation of interests:
• Accountants;
• Lawyers (including barristers, solicitors, attorneys-at-law, etc.);
• Labour unions;
• Business Associations;
• Trade Unions.
C. Dormant stakeholders (attribute: power)
Informal power based on independent expertise applies to these stakeholders:
• The Commission’s Group of Experts on Restructuring and Insolvency Law;30
• Academics;
• International Monetary Fund;
• United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL);
• World Bank.
The aforementioned overview shows in part a divide between the formal legis-
lative stakeholders versus the ‘other stakeholders’. Although some of these other
stakeholders may have a powerful informal position, from a strict legal perspective,
this is of secondary importance to that of the legislator. However, as Věra Jourová
stated too, in particular, some of these other stakeholders are the ones ‘to apply the
new rules as well as help deliver the beneﬁts to the Single Market’.31
D. Conclusion
In this section, ‘legislative governance’ is introduced as the governance of a legisla-
tive process in which a legislator engages with internal and external stakeholders.
In the Commission’s legislative governance regarding substantive insolvency law,
stakeholders can be deﬁned as:
Stakeholders are all those individuals, groups and other organisations that have an in-
terest in the EU legislative process of harmonising insolvency and restructuring law
and which have the ability to inﬂuence the choices and decisions the Commission has
to make.
In the ﬁeld of legislation, ranking of diverse interests of stakeholders can be
based on two out of the three attributes deﬁned by Mitchell et al. Stakeholders
30. This group has been initiated by the European
Commission, with the aim of assisting the Commission
in its work on a legislative proposal on substantive in-
solvency law. See http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/
regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.
groupDetail&groupID=3362.
31. Speech by Commissioner Jourová, previous
note 5.
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can be characterised by their ‘power’ and/or ‘legitimacy’, but in general, not with
‘urgency’. Different groups of stakeholders can be distinguished. The formal legis-
lative stakeholders (e.g. the Parliament, Council or Member States) are referred to
as dominant stakeholders with power and legitimacy of their interests. Other stake-
holders can have direct (e.g. debtor, shareholders or employees) or indirect (e.g. in-
solvency practitioners or accountants) legitimacy of their interests (the so-called
discretionary stakeholders). Dormant stakeholders are characterised by the power
of their interests (e.g. academia). Whereas this approach of prioritising interests
shows the strength of certain interests, it gives no substantive judgement on the
value of speciﬁc interests.
IV. The Emerging Role of Stakeholders in Insolvency
Some tendencies have strengthened the role of stakeholders in the ﬁeld of
restructuring and insolvency law, which include (i) the changing scope of insol-
vency regimes, (ii) the shifting focus of EU harmonisation of insolvency matters
and (iii) the quest for rescuing ﬁnancially distressed businesses.
A. The changing scope of insolvency regimes
Traditionally, interests of creditors were the most important interest for insolvency
regimes. This makes sense as insolvency regimes were primarily aimed at ensuring
equal treatment of creditors and maximising the value of the insolvent debtor’s es-
tate.32 Nowadays, it still is the primary interest of most insolvency regimes in
Europe, although their scope is extending to include, often of secondary impor-
tance, the interests of the debtor, employees and civil society.33
In theory, distinctions have been made between different approaches of insol-
vency regimes, including the creditor bargaining approach and the social beneﬁt
approach. The creditors’ bargaining approach regards the common pool problem
of limited funds. In the context of insolvency law, the focus is on maximising the
value solely for creditors. The social beneﬁt approach proclaims that laws should
serve various interests of society, which would otherwise not have been treated
fairly and equal, a ‘forum in which competing and various interests and values ac-
companying ﬁnancial distress may be expressed and sometimes recognized’.34
Recent developments in EU legislation have shown that the social beneﬁt ap-
proach is getting more inﬂuence. For instance, the EIR 2000 makes no references
to ‘stakeholders’, ‘civil society’ and ‘employees’. This changed with the EIR 2015,
32. See, for example, Louis Levinthal, ‘The Early His-
tory of Bankruptcy Law’ (1918) 66(5) University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review 223; Karl Gratzer and Dieter Stiefel
(eds), ‘History of Insolvency and Bankruptcy from an
International Perspective’ (2008) 38 Södertörn Academic
Studies 6.
33. See, for example, on the Netherlands: René Orij
and Gert-Jan Boon, ‘Stakeholderbelangen bij
bedrijven in zwaar weer: perspectieven op ﬁnanciële
en niet-ﬁnanciële belangen’ in Jan Adriaanse, Dick
van Offeren and Jean-Pierre van der Rest, ‘Turn-
around Management, Recht en Praktijk’ (Kluwer,
2016) (153–172).
34. David Morrison and Colin Anderson, ‘The
Australian Corporate Rescue Provisions: How do
they Compare?’ in Paul Omar (ed), International In-
solvency Law: Reforms and Challenges (Ashgate, 2013),
179 et seq.
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which makes some references to employees and the protection of jobs.35 It was the
Commission’s Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insol-
vency (Recommendation) that emphasises a broad group of interests (underlining
added):
The objective of this Recommendation is to ensure that viable enterprises in ﬁnancial
difﬁculties, wherever they are located in the Union, have access to national insolvency
frameworks which enable them to restructure at an early stage with a view to preventing
their insolvency, and therefore maximise the total value to creditors, employees, owners
and the economy as a whole.36
A particular landmark was the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency Law 1997 (‘UNCITRAL Model Law’) that provides a global set of rules for
implementation in national laws on cross-border insolvency cases.37 The
UNCITRAL Model Law was designed to achieve a ‘global solution for all stake-
holders of an insolvency proceeding’ and is designed also for ‘maximizing out-
comes for all stakeholders’.38
Another non-European illustration of promoting stakeholder involvement can
be derived from the USA where in 2014 the American Bankruptcy Institute
(ABI) presented a report (ABI Report) following an extensive study on a potential
reform of the US Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code on reorganisation proceedings.
The objective of the working group for the ABI Report was to (emphasis added):
[…] propose reforms to Chapter 11 and related statutory provisions that will better bal-
ance the goals of effectuating the effective reorganization of business debtors – with the
attendant preservation and expansion of jobs – and the maximization and realization of
asset values for all creditors and stakeholders.39
These developments highlight the changing scope of insolvency regimes, from a
creditor-bargaining approach in the direction of a social beneﬁt approach. No lon-
ger are the creditors’ interests the sole interests that are taken into consideration;
this is expanded to include a wider variety of interests.
35. See, inter alia, EIR 2015, Recitals 63 and 72;
Article 13.
36. Commission Recommendation of 12.3.2014 on a
new approach to business failure and insolvency
(2014/135/EU), Recital 1 (‘2014 Recommendation’).
In addition, Recital 12 states: ‘removing the barriers
to effective restructuring of viable companies in ﬁnan-
cial difﬁculties contributes to saving jobs and also ben-
eﬁts the wider economy’.
37. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency Law (1997) with Guide to Enactment and Inter-
pretation (2013), available at: <http://www.uncitral.
org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency.html>. See
also Bob Wessels and Gert-Jan Boon, ‘Cross-Border
Insolvency Law: International Instruments and Com-
mentary’ (2nd edn) (Kluwer Law International, 2015),
paragraph 8.
38. Ibid., paragraphs 69 and 161.
39. American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to
Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (2012–2014), Final
Report and Recommendations (2014) (‘ABI Final
Report’), 3, available at: <http://commission.abi.
org/ﬁnal-report>. The necessity of and the ap-
proach to better balance the interests of all stake-
holders has, however, been disputed by, for
example, the Loan and Syndications and Trading
Associations (LSTA) who argue that Chapter 11 is
currently sufﬁciently supporting the interests of all
involved stakeholders: LSTA, The Trouble with Un-
needed Bankruptcy Reform: The LSTA’s Response
to the ABI Chapter 11 Commission Report (2015),
35, 36, 46 and 55. See also Bob Wessels and Rolef
de Weijs (eds), International Contributions to the Reform of
Chapter 11 U.S. Bankruptcy Code (European and Interna-
tional Insolvency Law Studies 2) (Eleven International
Publishing, 2015).
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B. The shifting focus of EU harmonisation of insolvency
At the EU level, the focus has shifted from ad hoc harmonisation to procedural
harmonisation and substantive harmonisation. Up until 2000, only ad hoc
harmonisation of insolvency matters was observed in EU law. Take, for example,
the Transfer of Undertakings Directive, the European Travel Directive and also
the Directive on Employer Insolvency,40 which include harmonisation of certain
aspects of insolvency. This approach resulted in a diverse treatment of insolvency
related matters.
A next stage was reached with the adoption of the EIR 2000, which brought
procedural harmonisation of cross-border insolvency proceedings. From 2011 on-
wards, discussions started on further harmonisation of EU insolvency law. This in-
cluded a revision of the EIR 2000 and, in particular, harmonisation of certain
elements of substantive insolvency laws. Regarding the latter, the Commission pre-
sented its 2014 Recommendation on 12 March 201441 and, in November 2016, a
proposal for a Restructuring Directive. When successful, this will be a third stage in
the Europeanisation of insolvency law. It is important to note the increasing inva-
siveness of European legislation which, without doubt, will result in increased in-
terest from many (affected) stakeholders.42
C. Rescuing distressed businesses
Over the past two decades, a paradigm shift has taken place in legislative reforms
by moving away ‘[…] from the sacrosanct “pay what you owe” to the balanced
promotion of the continuity of companies in distress […]’.43 The EIR 2015 also
embraces the rescue perspective, as can be derived, for example, from the ex-
panded scope of insolvency proceedings of this regulation but also that secondary
proceedings can be a liquidation or restructuring proceeding or the option for the
insolvency practitioner to give an undertaking.44 Also, in the Recommendation,
the European Commission has shown its dedication to harmonise substantive in-
solvency law, in particular, to ‘restructure [ﬁnancially distressed but economically
viable businesses] at an early stage with a view to preventing their insolvency, and
therefore maximise the total value to creditors, employees, owners and the econ-
omy as a whole’.45 The involvement of concerned stakeholders may be a necessary
and sensible consequence.
40. Originally adopted as Directive 77/187/EEC on
the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in
the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or
parts of businesses; Council Directive 90/314/EEC
of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays
and package tours; and Council Directive 80/987/
EEC of 20 October 1980 on the approximation of
the laws of the Member States relating to the protec-
tion of employees in the event of the insolvency of their
employer.
41. For a commentary on the 2014 Recommendation,
see Stephan Madaus, ‘The EU Recommendation on
Business Rescue – Only Another Statement or a Cause
of Legislative Action Across Europe?’ (2014) 27(6) In-
solvency Intelligence 81.
42. On the three stages of the Europeanisation of insol-
vency law, see also Bob Wessels, ‘On the Future of Eu-
ropean Insolvency Law’ in Rebecca Parry (ed),
European Insolvency Law: Prospects for Reform (INSOL
Europe, 2014) (131–158), also published in (2014) 3 In-
ternational Insolvency Law Review 310.
43. Ibid., 157.
44. EIR 2015, Recitals 10–17; Articles 1, 2(4), 3(2)–(3)
and 36.
45. See 2014 Recommendation, Recital 1.
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This more holistic approach to rescuing distressed (but economically viable)
businesses, instead of pure piecemeal liquidation, is also emphasised in the ABI Re-
port of 2014. They stated that:
Chapter 11 works to rehabilitate companies, preserve jobs, and provide value to creditors
only if distressed companies and their stakeholders actually use the chapter 11 process to
facilitate an in-court or out-of-court resolution of the company’s ﬁnancial distress’.46
An integrative approach concerning a wider group of stakeholders is a necessary
to effectively rescue businesses, in particular, at an early stage of ﬁnancial distress.
Where out-of-court solutions are employed to rescue the business, trust and support
of a company’s stakeholders is a prerequisite for successfully restructuring the com-
pany both in the short run and in facilitating a sustainable outlook in the long term.
Furthermore, it is also argued that themere involvement of the ‘insolvency crowd’ in
decisions regarding restructuring will lead to better decision making. Drawing on
collective intelligence theory, a group instead of individual experts may be more ef-
fective in a restructuring.47 At the same time, involvement of a wide group of stake-
holders in preparing legislation may be effective in evidencing the extent to which
substantive harmonisation of insolvency law is feasible and (politically) desirable.
D. Conclusion
Several developments have over time increased stakeholder involvement in insol-
vency legislation and also in the legislative processes. First of all, insolvency regimes
expanded their focus to include the interests of stakeholders such as the debtor, em-
ployees and civil society, in addition to those of creditors. This has been advocated,
in particular, not only in the UNCITRALModel Law on Insolvency but also in the
EIR 2015 and theCommission’s Recommendation. Secondly, where harmonisation
was characterised by ad hoc efforts until the adoption of the EIR 2000 with proce-
dural harmonisation, the Commission is working toward a next phase of substantive
harmonisation of insolvency law. This is a process of increased Europeanisation of
insolvency regimes, with increasing affecting various parties. Thirdly, there is a
stronger desire to rescue distressed businesses instead of piece-meal liquidation. To
achieve a successful restructuring, trust and support from concerned stakeholders
is required. Therefore, involvement of stakeholders is necessary too.
The involvement of all concerned stakeholders works especially well with the so-
cial beneﬁt approach. With the rescue of a distressed business, the interests in the
company of stakeholders are, to a greater or lesser extent, secured with the protec-
tion of jobs, human capital,48 continuation of trade agreements, payment of taxes
and so forth.
46. ABI Final Report, previous note 39, 6.
47. This is illustrated by Stephan Madaus with regard
to accepting or rejecting rescue plans: ‘On Decision-
Making in Rescue Cases’ in Bernard Santen and Dick
van Offeren (eds), Perspectives on International Insolvency
Law: A Tribute to Bob Wessels (Kluwer, 2014) (215–228).
48. Referred to by Michelle Harner as one of the soft
variables that companies possess: ‘The Value of Soft
Variables in Corporate Reorganizations’ (2015) Univer-
sity of Illinois Law Review 509.
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V. Toward Harmonisation of EU Insolvency and Restructuring Laws
A. The road toward harmonisation
Where various developments argue in favour of stakeholder involvement, this
was not yet the approach when, in 2011, the European Parliament adopted a
resolution requesting the Commission to submit proposals for legislative mea-
sures with regard to insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company
law (Resolution).49 This Resolution was the so-called ‘kick-off’ for initiatives
in which active stakeholder involvement developed over time. The Commis-
sion responded initially at the end of 2012 with a ‘Communication on a
new European approach to business failure and insolvency’ (Communication)
that emphasised the necessity of a shared European rescue and recovery
culture.50
On the same day the Commission’s Communication went out (12 Decem-
ber 2012), a legislative process also started with the Commission’s proposal to
revise the EIR 2000.51 Two studies were conducted to review the working of
the EIR 2000.52 An expert group was formed to assist the Commission in
the drafting process,53 a public consultation was held and two meetings took
place with national experts. This contributed to the adoption of the EIR
2015.
On 12 March 2014, the Commission had also published its 2014 Recommen-
dation. In the preparation of the Recommendation, the Commission sought input
and commissioned a study to INSOL Europe on national insolvency regimes.54
Eighteen months after the issuance of the Recommendation,55 the Commission
concluded in the evaluation that ‘[…] a few Member States have undertaken re-
forms which, in some cases, resulted in legislation implementing the Commis-
sion’s Recommendation […]’. Still, many Member States did not contemplate
or launch reforms, sometimes as they consider their regimes in line with the Rec-
ommendation. This lead the Commission to conclude that the Recommendation
49. Previous note 1.
50. Communication from the Commission to the Eu-
ropean Parliament, the Council and the European
Economic and Social Committee, a new European ap-
proach to business failure and insolvency, 12.12.2012,
COM(2012) 742 ﬁnal, 3, 5–8.
51. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000
on insolvency proceedings, COM(2012) 744 ﬁnal, Ex-
planatory Memorandum, 4–5.
52. Report from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council and the European Economic and
Social Committee on the application of the Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on
insolvency proceedings of 12.12.2012, COM(2012)
743 ﬁnal, available at:<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
civil/ﬁles/insolvency-report_en.pdf>. For the
comparative legal study, see Burkhard Hess, Paul
Oberhammer and Thomas Pfeiffer, European Insol-
vency Law, the Heidelberg-Luxemburg-Vienna Re-
port on the Application of Regulation (EC) No.
1346/2000/EC on Insolvency Proceedings (External
Evaluation JUST/2011/JCIV/PR/0049/A4) (2013),
available at:<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/ﬁles/
evaluation_insolvency_en.pdf> (also published as
Burkhard Hess, Paul Oberhammer and Thomas
Pfeiffer, European Insolvency Law: The Heidelberg-
Luxembourg-Vienna Report (Beck–Hart–Nomos, 2014).
53. Previous note 30.
54. INSOL Europe, Study on a New Approach to
Business Failure and Insolvency – Comparative Legal
Analysis of the Member States’ Relevant Provisions
and Practices (presented to the European Commission)
(2014).
55. 2014 Recommendation, Articles 35–36.
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did not have the desired impact.56 An Impact Assessment that was published in
March 2016 reiterated the same conclusion.57
In September 2015, a new initiative was announced with a public consultation
on a European capital markets union (CMU), with the aim to promote diversiﬁca-
tion of and access to the funding needs of businesses.58 In the subsequent Action
Plan, the Commission considered, out of 20 key actions, ‘insolvency’ as one of
the key actions for a CMU and that a legislative initiative would be prepared in this
area.59 This resulted in the proposal of the Commission of 16 November 2016 for
a Restructuring Directive.
Often for good reasons, substantive harmonisation of insolvency laws has been
considered impractical and unfeasible.60 However, since 2012, the Commission
has shown its dedication to promote the rescue of distressed businesses, although,
in particular, the widely diverging national insolvency regimes and (ii) the
embeddedness of insolvency law is mentioned as a hindrance to harmonisation.
B. Widely diverging national insolvency regimes
Over the last few years, several studies on national insolvency regimes have been
conducted at the request of the Commission.61 They highlight the widely diverging
approaches adopted by Member States ﬁnancially distressed businesses. Also, the
evaluation of the Commission’s Recommendation shows that Member States have
not yet adopted a shared approach.62 The Commission too has repeatedly ob-
served that great differences exist between national insolvency regimes, limiting
the functioning of the internal market and creating a barrier for harmonisation
of EU insolvency and restructuring law. It is stated both in the recitals to the
EIR 2000 as well as the EIR 2015 that ‘as a result of the widely differing substan-
tive laws it is not practical to introduce insolvency proceedings with universal scope
in the entire Community’.63
56. European Commission, Directorate-General Jus-
tice & Consumers of the European Commission, Eval-
uation of the Implementation of the Commission
Recommendation of 12.3.2014 on a New Approach
to Business Failure and Insolvency (30 September
2015), 2 and 5.
57. European Commission, Directorate-General Jus-
tice (A1), 2016/JUST/025 – Insolvency II, inception
Impact Assessment (3 March 2016), 7.
58. Communication from the Commission to the Eu-
ropean Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, Action Plan on Building a Capital Mar-
kets Union, 30.09.2015, COM(2015) 468 ﬁnal, 3.
59. Ibid., 26 and 30. This was reiterated in European
Commission, Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Central Bank, the European Economic and So-
cial Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
‘Towards the Completion of the Banking Union’ (24
November 2015), COM(2015) 587 ﬁnal, 10.
60. See, for example, ‘The H-word is out!’ observed by
Bob Wessels, ‘Harmonization of Insolvency Law in Eu-
rope’ (2011) 8(1) European Company Law 27 et seq. See
also Björn Laukemann, ‘Structural Aspects of Harmo-
nization in European Insolvency Law’ in Jean-François
Vandrooghenbroeck et al. (eds), Le Temps et Le Droit:
Hommage au Professeur Gilberte Closset-Marchal (Larcier,
2013), 347 et seq.; Christoph Paulus, ‘Europeanisation
of the Member States’ Insolvency Laws’ (2015) 3 Not-
tingham Insolvency and Business Law e-Journal 301 et seq.
61. See Hess et al., previous note 52; INSOL Europe,
previous note 54; University of Leeds, Study on a
New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency:
Comparative Legal Analysis of the Member States’
Relevant Provisions and Practices (2016), available at:
<https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-de-
tail/-/publication/3eb2f832-47f3-11e6-9c64-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en>.
62. See previous notes 56–57.
63. EIR 2000, Recital 11; EIR 2015, Recital 22.
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C. Embeddedness of insolvency law
Furthermore, insolvency law is closely intertwined with various ﬁelds of law, in-
cluding company law, contract law, employment law, tax law and security law.64
This brings additional complexity in the harmonisation of insolvency related issues
on a European level. Therefore, harmonisation might be realised most easily for
those topics that are especially (and exclusively) dealt with under insolvency
law.65 In its 2014 Recommendation, the Commission selected such topics. For a
CMU, such efforts may fall short, in that context, we will see proposals that address
topics that are at the crossroads of various ﬁelds of law, which will, of course, bring
additional complexity to the harmonisation efforts.
D. The Commission’s involvement of stakeholders
With the foregoing in mind, any legislative proposal to substantively harmonise in-
solvency law will have a signiﬁcant impact on national insolvency regimes. There-
fore, it comes as no surprise that the Commission has sought to interact with
stakeholders to ﬁne-tune its Proposal for a Restructuring Directive. Also, involve-
ment and support for any legislative proposal from such a broad group of stake-
holders may be compelling for EU Member States too. It is what could be called
a horizontal approach where extensive consultation takes place to involve stake-
holders (already) in preparation of a legislative proposal, contrary to the traditional
vertical approach where stakeholder involvement relates mostly to consultation on
a published legislative proposal.
The Commission employed various activities in which stakeholders are in-
volved, this includes among others:
• Discussions with a group of experts on restructuring and insolvency law.66 This group,
established in 2015 and expected to continue until 2018, consists of 22 individual experts
and four institutional observers. These are what the Commission calls ‘type A’ and ‘type
E’ members.67 The individual experts are practitioners, academics and judges from
mostly western European countries and are appointed based on their personal capacity.
Observers are public entities, mostly international organisations. The experts assist the
Commission directly in drafting the legislative proposal. Also, they assist the Commission
in its coordination and cooperation with both Member States and stakeholders.68 These
groups, in the ﬁeld of insolvency (a previous group on cross-border insolvency was
64. See, for example, European Parliament,
‘Harmonisation of insolvency law at EU level, note’,
European Parliament 2010, PE419.633, 27; Bob
Wessels, ‘Harmonisation of Requirements for Insol-
vency Holders on a European Level’ in Reinhard
Bork, Goehard Kayser and Frank Kebus, Festschrift für
Bruno M. Kübler zum 70. Geburtstag (Beck, 2015), 760.
65. Laukemann, previous note 60, 348.
66. Previous note 30. Reports of the expert group’s
meetings are published at this website. The group con-
sists of 22 experts (comprising academics, judges and
practitioners) and two international organisations.
With regard to the functioning of expert groups they
are guided, since 2010, by a Communication from
the President to the Commission, Framework for Com-
mission Expert Groups: Horizontal Rules and Public
Register, C(2010) 7649 ﬁnal that was revised in 2016
with the Commission Decision of 30.05.2010 establish-
ing horizontal rules on the creation and operation of
Commission expert groups, C(2016) 3301 ﬁnal (‘Com-
mission Decision 2010’).
67. Commission Decision 2010, Article 7(2).
68. Ibid., Article 3(1)(c).
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initiated to assist on the revision of the EIR 2000),69 are established for speciﬁc matters
only and usually operate on a temporary basis. With the increasing involvement of the
Commission in insolvency law, establishing a permanent expert group on insolvency
law could be considered.70
• Stakeholder meetings. In the course of 2016, the Commission organised several meetings
with diverse stakeholders to discuss the possibilities for a new legislative proposal on in-
solvency. Three informal stakeholder meetings took place in April, May and July, which
functioned as a sounding board for the Commission.71 In addition, on 12 July 2016, a
conference, hosted by the Commission and under the auspices of the Slovak Presidency
of the Council, was held on convergence of insolvency frameworks within the European
Union. This conference was attended by some 250 representatives of national govern-
ments, national parliaments, European Commission, European Parliament, courts, in-
solvency practitioners, business associations, consumer associations, academia, lawyers,
banks, trade unions and labour unions.72
• Public consultations on an effective insolvency law within the EU. The Commission con-
ducted two public consultations where harmonisation of insolvency laws was considered.
Firstly, in 2015, with regard to the CMU, a public consultation was conducted in which
one question touched upon harmonisation of insolvency. Secondly, in 2016, after it was
announced that a legislative proposal would be prepared, an in-depth consultation on
harmonisation of insolvency law was conducted. These public consultations will be
discussed more extensively in Section VI.
The aforementioned examples of stakeholder involvement took place in 2015
and 2016, in the phase where the Commission has been preparing the proposal
for a Restructuring Directive and where no draft texts were publicly available.
The Commission will need to consider whether further involvement of stake-
holders is beneﬁcial and does not bring unintended inﬂuence on the legislative pro-
cess. It is not clear whether (certain) stakeholders will be involved now the proposal
has been published and the legislative process is on its way.73 Besides the group of
experts, which is expected to continue until 2018,74 no further details have been
announced.
E. Conclusion
Since the 2011 Resolution of the European Parliament, the Commission has been
dedicated to promoting the rescue of ﬁnancially distressed but economically viable
69. Previous note 30.
70. In contrast to, for example, company law (Group
E01456), there is no permanent expert group on insol-
vency law.
71. These meetings took place on 7 April 2016, 27
May 2016 and 18 July 2016. The minutes of the meet-
ing of the informal stakeholder group were published
and made available (temporarily) at the website of the
Commission. Participants of these meetings included
BusinessEurope, AFME, EBF, ACCA, UEAPME,
ESBA, Independent Retail Europe, EuroChambers,
ETUC, EFIN, FEE, INSOL Europe, FDC, The
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe and the
European Law Institute.
72. For more information on this event, see: http://ec.
europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=
30874. A video recording of the conference is available
at: https://webcast.ec.europa.eu/insolvency-
conference#.
73. In the legislative process, several steps have been
made. For more information, see <http://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=
CELEX:52016PC0723>.
74. See the Call for a Group of Experts on insolvency
and restructuring, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/
transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.
groupDetail&groupID=3362>.
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businesses. This has resulted, in particular, in a Communication (2012), a Recom-
mendation (2014) and a legislative proposal in (2016). Until 2015, the involvement
of stakeholders has been limited. Besides some studies and an expert group, stake-
holders’ involvement was limited. At the same time, not only studies on national
regimes but also analyses of the Commission and the European Parliament
pointed out that any legislative effort in this regard would be complex. This is,
in particular, due to (i) the widely differing national insolvency regimes and (ii)
the great extent to which insolvency law is intertwined with other ﬁelds of law.
Therefore, harmonisation efforts will touch upon the interests of many affected
stakeholders. This is also why the involvement of stakeholders by means of expert
groups, stakeholder meetings and public consultations, comes as no surprise. This
involvement took off especially after the preparation of a legislative proposal was
announced. It is not clear in what way stakeholders remain involved, except for
the group of experts that will continue to assist the Commission until 2018.
VI. Stakeholder Sentiments: The Public Consultations on CMU and on
an Effective European Insolvency Framework
The Commission conducted two public consultations, in 2015 and 2016, that con-
sidered insolvency. They show what the targeted audience is of the Commission,
what topics they are requested to respond too, what types of respondents are in-
volved and what their positions are. Both consultations will be brieﬂy described.
A. Public consultation on building a capital markets union
In 2015, with regard to the CMU,75 the Commission surveyed on harmonising in-
solvency laws in Europe.76 In the public consultation, it was asked to respondents:
‘What speciﬁc aspects of insolvency laws would need to be harmonised in order to
support the emergence of a pan-European capital market?’77 The consultation,
which was open to all citizens and organisations, resulted in some 422 responses
from a wide variety of stakeholders.78 The wording of several respondents
75. Previous note 58.
76. Public Consultation: Building a Capital Markets
Union (18 February 2015–13 May 2015), for which
see <http://ec.europa.eu/ﬁnance/consultations/
2015/capital-markets-union/index_en.htm>.
77. This public consultation ran from 18 February
2015 to 13 May 2015 and was based on the Commis-
sion’s Green Paper ‘Building a Capital Markets Union,
19.02.2015’. The responses to the questionnaire were
made available at <https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/
publication/capital-markets-union-2015?
surveylanguage=en>. A summary of the responses is
provided in Commission Staff Working Document,
Feedback Statement on the Green Paper ‘Building a
Capital Markets Union’ accompanying the document
Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets
Union of 30.9.2015, SWD(2015) 184 ﬁnal (‘Feedback
Statement’), for which see <http://ec.europa.eu/ﬁ-
nance/consultations/2015/capital-markets-union/
docs/summary-of-responses_en.pdf>.
78. In total, some 422 respondents from across the 27
Member States and beyond submitted a response on
the 32 questions of this consultation (346 responses
were made public). This includes (representatives of)
Member States and Ministries (of Finance), non-
governmental organisations, international or Euro-
pean organisations, industry/business associations,
trade unions, companies, SMEs, microenterprises, sole
traders, private individuals, banks, pension funds, cen-
tral banks, capital market regulators and supervisors,
consumer organisations, think tanks and research
institutes.
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appeared similar, although submitted by different organisations. For instance, this
can relate to a ‘professional’ organisation preparing multiple responses for speciﬁc
stakeholders or indicate some sort of manipulation of the outcomes.
The Commission concluded from the responses that a lack of harmonised insol-
vency law is regarded as one of the main barriers to bank and non-bank direct
lending to companies and that harmonisation of certain aspects of insolvency law
is recommended.79 The stakeholders that took part in this public consultation took
varying positions on harmonisation80:
• Banks favour reform of certain aspects of national insolvency regimes at the EU level.
• Pension funds and other ﬁnancial intermediaries noted that the diverging national insol-
vency laws should be reformed, but this is a long-term project.
• Member States and Ministries of Finance were hesitant about harmonisation. They
might consider a step-by-step approach in increasing approximation of national insol-
vency laws, possibly accompanied by measures to strengthen national insolvency
frameworks.
• Central Banks showed support for a more comprehensive reform of the diverging na-
tional insolvency regimes.
• Capital Market Regulators similarly expressed support for a reform of insolvency re-
gimes, as the current differences create barriers to cross-border investments.
• Business Associations showed diverse responses on the harmonisation of insolvency laws.
• SME Representatives expressed that efﬁciency and effectiveness of insolvency practi-
tioners and courts could be improved with harmonisation.
• Labour unions support a wide-ranging harmonisation of insolvency frameworks.
• Research Institutes favour harmonisation to realise better reallocation of capital and
bring more economic growth.
In general, stakeholders expressed support for (partial) substantive
harmonisation of insolvency law.81 However, Member States and Ministries of Fi-
nance seemed more cautious (Figure 2). Out of the 12 substantive responses from
Governments and Ministries,82 ﬁve showed some interest to further study possibil-
ities for partial harmonisation, including Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany,
the Netherlands and Sweden. Other responses stated that harmonisation would
not be desirable or that current measures would sufﬁce.83
The respondents to the public consultation made various suggestions for speciﬁc
topics that would be ready for harmonisation. They suggested, among others, the
following topics:
79. Feedback Statement, previous note 77, 2.6; Annex
Q 5.6, Q15.1, Q16.1, Q19.1, Q24, Q27.1, Q27.2 and
Q29.
80. Ibid., at Q29.3.
81. From the 346 public responses, about 25% of the
responses showed support (to some degree) for substan-
tive harmonisation, against less than 10% of the re-
spondents stating substantive harmonisation would
not be desirable or possible (considering the great di-
vergences among countries). Most of the remaining re-
spondents did not answer Q29 on harmonisation of
insolvency law.
82. Responses were received from several
Governments/Ministries. Those from Austria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, States
of Guernsey, Hungary, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Jer-
sey, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia,
Sweden and the United Kingdom were published.
Only 12 responses touched upon the issue of
harmonisation of insolvency law, while six responses
provided no answer.
83. Feedback Statement, previous note 77, Annex
Q29.
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• Common deﬁnitions of, for example, default, avoidance actions, restructuring of
companies, stay on individual creditor claims, discharge period and close-out-
netting;
• Preventive restructuring proceedings, out-of-court and hybrid restructuring proceedings;
• Communications on the opening of insolvency proceedings and the measures to be taken
upon commencement;
• Requirements for opening insolvency proceedings;
• Ring-fencing of a client’s securities (for insolvent ﬁnancial intermediaries);
• Ranking of creditor’s claims;
• Qualiﬁcations, tasks and rights of insolvency practitioners
• Liability of directors and shadow directors;
• Time cap on insolvency proceedings;
• Establishment of an EU register with information on insolvencies;
• A single form for the petition of claims;
• Second chance for entrepreneurs; and
• Personal insolvency.
From the responses, the Commission derived that insolvency proceedings are
considered a key barrier to a CMU, especially as inefﬁciency and the great diver-
sity of national insolvency regimes inhibit the possibility to assess the risks associ-
ated with making cross-border investments. It was commented often that the
Figure 2. Sentiments of Member States and Ministries of Finance toward harmonisation.Source:
Author’s Own. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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harmonisation is not only complex, in particular due to its embeddedness in other
ﬁelds of law, but also a long-term rather than short-term endeavour.
B. Public consultation on effective insolvency frameworks
For a period of 12 weeks (23 March 2016 to 14 June 2016), the Commission
also held a public consultation directed at distinguishing the barriers to
effective insolvency frameworks within the EU. The consultation was open to
the ‘views and input from the broadest public possible’, including ‘citizens,
companies (including SMEs and entrepreneurs), business associations, public
authorities, consumer organisations, as well as insolvency practitioners,
researchers and think tanks, courts and public administrative bodies at interna-
tional, EU-wide, national, regional and/or local levels’ it resulted in over 260
respondents.84
The consultation has predominantly an explorative character, as the results
would be used to devise relevant topics for the Commission’s legislative proposal.
The consultation related to ‘efﬁcient organisation of debt restructuring procedures’
and ‘the rationale and the process for debt discharge for entrepreneurs (and its pos-
sible extension to consumers)’.85
The topics of the consultation are based, in particular, on the 2014 Recommen-
dation and include among others86:
• Effect of differences between the laws of the Member States, in particularly at newly
established companies and saving distressed but viable companies;
• Involvement of courts in restructuring procedures;
• Publicity for restructuring procedures;
• Assessment of the viability of a distressed debtor;
• Debtor-in-possession;
• Stay;
• Adoption of restructuring plan and cram-down;
• Protection of rescue ﬁnance;
• Directors’ liability;
• Second chance for over-indebted honest debtors (entrepreneurs and consumers);
• Recovery of debts, including ranking of claims and avoidance actions;
• Professional standards for insolvency practitioners; and
• Disqualiﬁcation of debtors.
A summary of the results is published by the Commission and shows that Mem-
ber States take a different position to the other stakeholders, in line with the earlier
public consultation on the CMU. The Member States, in general, preferred a
84. Consultation on an effective insolvency framework
within the EU from 23 March 2016–14 June 2016, for
which see <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/
civil/opinion/160321_en.htm>. The Commission re-
ported on this public consultation in its proposal for a
Restructuring Directive. There were over 260 respon-
dents from the 27 Member States.
85. Idem. See also the introduction to the question-
naire of the public consultation itself.
86. Questionnaire for the public consultation on an
effective insolvency framework within the EU. Re-
sponses to the consultation could also be submitted
by (e-)mail to the DG Justice, Unit A1 – Civil Justice
Policy.
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principle-based approach, as the embeddedness of insolvency laws prevents more
substantive harmonisation at this point. Other stakeholders were in favour of a
framework with minimum rules on early recourse for distressed businesses and a
second chance for honest bankrupt entrepreneurs.87
C. Conclusion
From the public consultations in 2015 and 2016 on insolvency, the observation
may be made that, in general, there is support for furthering the adoption of a Eu-
ropean insolvency framework. The major divergences between the regimes of
Member States create a barrier for harmonisation, as well as the embeddedness
of insolvency law. At the same time, it necessitates action from the Commission
in order to promote the free ﬂow of capital across the EU as well as the assessment
of investment risks.
Support for this is given by a variety of stakeholders, including banks, central
banks, capital market regulators, business associations, labour unions and research
institutes, which are mostly the so-called dormant and discretionary stakeholders.
However, Member States and Ministries of Finance (which can be classiﬁed as
dominant stakeholders) seem to lack ambition and support for substantive
harmonisation. They appear more reluctant and sometimes dismissive in (further)
legislative efforts in this area. Perhaps, this could have been derived already from
not only the mild adoption of the Commission’s Recommendation but also na-
tional political considerations can play a role here.
VII. The Way Forward with Stakeholders
The previous conclusion leads to the (for some not so surprising) observation
that expectations for a harmonisation of EU insolvency and restructuring law
should not be too farfetched. However, the support of various stakeholders, es-
pecially from practice, may promote the Commission’s initiative with, for exam-
ple, Member States. Where a standstill in the legislation might still be risked,
the Commission could draw on several experiences from other ﬁelds where
the use of soft law has been considered. This would be in line with the ‘open
method of coordination’, as suggested by Ian Fletcher and Bob Wessels, where
traditional hierarchical legislation is supported by soft-law instruments.88 Two
examples may be provided to illustrate how soft law can assist the insolvency
endeavour.
87. Restructuring Directive, Explanatory Memoran-
dum, 17.
88. Fletcher and Wessels, previous note 2, paragraphs
146 and 216. See also <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
summary/glossary/open_method_coordination.
html>.
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A. Inspiration from the Mediation Directive
The EU Mediation Directive is aimed at securing better access to justice by pro-
moting amicable settlement of all cross-border civil and commercial disputes as
well as providing a predictable legal framework.89 In 2016, an evaluation was per-
formed of the 2008 Mediation Directive.90 In advance, the Commission conducted
a public consultation that resulted in over 500 responses from interested individ-
uals, mediators, judges, lawyers, other legal practitioners, academics, public au-
thorities and Member States.91 The evaluation shows that the Mediation
Directive has functioned as an ‘impetus to a wider take-up of mediation also in a
purely domestic context across the EU’.92 Still, difﬁculties arise with regard to
the functioning of national mediation systems and further improvement would
be required.
In the area of insolvency, more importantly, the Commission reminds that the
Mediation Directive would also apply to restructurings. The Commission recom-
mend appointment of mediators by courts to support the negotiation of a
restructuring plan. However, at the same time, the Commission concluded that
mediation in insolvency proceedings has remained underdeveloped.93
The evaluation showed that the Mediation Directive has been imple-
mented in different ways and that stakeholder positions are diverse on what
further action to take.94 Member States were reluctant to implement addi-
tional legislation. In particular, practitioners were supportive of further legis-
lative action relating to, for example, quality standards for mediation
services and making mediation compulsory in certain types of disputes.95
The Commission made the recommendation to Member States to further the
implementation of the Mediation Directive and point out best practices for
Member States and practitioners.96 This may not be surprising as mediation is
governed in many EU jurisdictions by codes of conduct.97 However, it shows a
practical solution to provide practitioners with room for approximation of na-
tional regimes.
89. Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on certain aspects of media-
tion in civil and commercial matters; Report from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council
and the European Economic and Social Committee on
the application of Directive 2008/52/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects
of mediation in civil and commercial matters, 26 Au-
gust 2016, COM(2016) 542 ﬁnal (‘Mediation Report’),
paragraphs 1.1 and 4.
90. Mediation Report, previous note 89.
91. Ibid., paragraph 1.3.
92. Ibid., paragraph 4.
93. Ibid., paragraph 3.2. See also Bob Wessels, ‘Medi-
ation in Restructuring and Insolvency’ (2016) July(3)
Tijdschrift voor Arbitrage 59.
94. Ibid., paragraphs 2 and 4.
95. Ibid., paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.6.
96. Ibid., paragraph 4. These best practices concern:
‘[…] requirements for parties to state in their applica-
tions to courts whether mediation has been attempted,
in particular in family law matters obligatory informa-
tion sessions within the framework of a judicial proce-
dure and an obligation on courts to consider
mediation at every stage of judicial proceedings, ﬁnan-
cial incentives making it economically more attractive
for parties to use mediation instead of resorting to judi-
cial proceedings, ensuring enforceability without neces-
sarily requiring the consent of all parties to the
agreement.
97. Ibid., paragraph 3.3.1 see in particular the Euro-
pean Code of Conduct for Mediators, available
at<http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr_ec_
code_conduct_en.pdf>.
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B. Inspiration from Recital 48 of the European Insolvency Regulation (recast)
Another example of semi-legislation was incorporated in the EIR 2015. Here, ob-
ligations for cooperation and communication have been extended signiﬁcantly.
Not only insolvency practitioners but also courts must cooperate and communicate
closely with each other in cross-border insolvency cases.98 In Recital 48 EIR (re-
cast), the EIR 2015 left room to further specify these obligations:
[…] When cooperating, insolvency practitioners and courts should take into account
best practices for cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases, as set out in principles
and guidelines on communication and cooperation adopted by European and interna-
tional organisations active in the area of insolvency law, and in particular the relevant
guidelines prepared by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(Uncitral).
The EU legislator has given explicit room to groups of European or interna-
tional stakeholders to develop further guidance on communication and coopera-
tion for insolvency practitioners and courts. This novelty in the ﬁeld of
European insolvency law can be an effective approach to allow for a sort of
harmonisation based on self-regulation of stakeholders by means of principles
and guidelines, which function within the scope of an EU legislative instrument.
Formulating such provisions should receive considerable attention. Recital 48 of
the EIR 2015, for example, states that in particular, the guidelines prepared by
UNCITRAL are relevant. Remarkably, UNCITRAL has provided no ‘guidelines’
with regard to communication and cooperation. It is therefore not clear what the
EU legislator is referring to. Perhaps it is the UNCITRAL Model Law, whose Ar-
ticles 25–27 relate to cooperation and communication in cross-border insolvency
cases.99 At the same time, the EIR 2015 may refer to the UNCITRAL Practice
Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation (2009) that provides, for example,
insights on cooperation and sample clauses for insolvency agreements (also known
as protocols).100 Alternatively, it could refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency: The Judicial Perspective (2013) that provides some guid-
ance to courts on cooperation and communication. Therefore, the EU legislator
should provide stakeholders with clear directions on the scope, status and adoption
of principles and guidelines.101
C. Conclusion
Where support from Member States (dominant stakeholders) may be lacking for
substantive harmonisation of insolvency law, despite the support from dormant
98. EIR 2015, Articles 41–44. For group proceedings,
comparable obligations have been provided for insol-
vency practitioners and courts, for which see EIR
2015, Articles 56–59.
99. Wessels and Boon, previous note 37, paragraph 8.
100. UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border In-
solvency Cooperation (2009), available at: <http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insol-
vency.html>; Wessels and Boon, previous note 37,
paragraph 11.
101. UNCITRAL Model Law: The Judicial Perspec-
tive (2011), available at: <http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency.html>; Wessels
and Boon, previous note 37, paragraph 14.
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and discretionary stakeholders, we could draw from experiences in other ﬁelds.
Here, examples with regard to soft law show how the EU legislator can involve
stakeholders, also in executing EU law by creating room for non-binding principles
and guidelines on matters where EU legislation is absent.
These examples include the 2016 evaluation of the Mediation Directive where
Member States were reluctant to introduce additional legislation, but other stake-
holders were supportive of further legislative action. The Commission decided rec-
ommended that recommendations and best practices should be proposed to
Member States and practitioners to promote further approximation. Another ex-
ample relates to the EIR 2015, where Recital 48 leaves room for self-regulation
by European and international organisations. It states – in brief – that such orga-
nisations may develop guidelines and recommendations to support insolvency
practitioners and courts in communication and cooperation in cross-border insol-
vency cases. Within the scope of an EU instrument and, within certain conditions,
stakeholders are permitted to develop principle and best practices.
These examples illustrate alternatives for the EU legislator when support for
(speciﬁc parts of) harmonisation is lacking. Stakeholders, in particular from prac-
tice and academia, could develop such principles and best practices to further spe-
ciﬁc elements of an effective restructuring framework for distressed businesses in
Europe.
VIII. Conclusion
In its preparatory work for a legislative proposal on substantive harmonisation of
insolvency laws in Europe, the European Commission has given stakeholders a
prominent role. However, it remained undecided not only who these stakeholders
are, why the Commission is involving them but also whether and to what extent it
is justiﬁable to involve them in a legislative process.
In Sections II and III, elaboration was made on what stakeholders are, in par-
ticular, regarding the Commission’s legislative governance and how different stake-
holders can be distinguished and prioritised in the ﬁeld of insolvency law.
Following the deﬁnition proposed by Savage et al., stakeholders need (i) to have
an interest in the actions of an organisation, which arguably is present when an or-
ganisation’s actions affect these interests and (ii) be able to inﬂuence the organisa-
tion. The Commission does not apply a formal approach to these dimensions of
stakeholders, as also non-legislative parties are involved in its activities and are
therefore also considered a stakeholder. For the legislative activities on
harmonisation of insolvency law, stakeholders can be deﬁned as:
all those individuals, groups and other organisations that have an interest in the EU leg-
islative process of harmonising insolvency and restructuring law and which have the
ability to inﬂuence the choices and decisions the Commission has to make.
With the Commission’s broad perspective on stakeholders, differentiation of
stakeholders is even more complex. Distinguishing and prioritising of interest can
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be based on the salience of interests. Salience can be reviewed on the basis three
attributes: (i) power, (ii) legitimacy and (iii) urgency. Urgency will, in general, not
be an attribute likely present for stakeholders in a legislative process. Prioritising
of interests, without prejudice to speciﬁc interests, can be based on the number
of attributes they possess. This leads to three types of stakeholders in the legislative
process of the Commission:
1 Dominant stakeholders: they possess both power and legitimacy. This includes foremost
formal legislative bodies, such as the Council and the European Parliament.
2 Discretionary stakeholders: they possess legitimacy. It relates not only to direct and
indirect parties involved in insolvency proceedings, such as debtors, creditors and
employees, but also insolvency practitioners and trade unions.
3 Dormant stakeholders: they possess power. This group includes not only academics, the
Commission’s expert group, but also international organisations such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, UNCITRAL and the World Bank.
The emerging role of stakeholders in the ﬁeld of insolvency law was discussed in
Section IV. Insolvency regimes around the world have shifted their focus, in gen-
eral, from a creditor’s bargaining approach toward a more social beneﬁt minded
approach with room for the interests of creditors and other stakeholders. At a
European level, insolvency law is no longer treated on an ad hoc basis. The EIR
2000 (and the EIR 2015) brought harmonisation of mainly procedural rules and,
since 2011, efforts are made to harmonise also substantive insolvency laws. Such a
legislative process will be more invasive on the interests of both creditors and other
stakeholders. This is especially true where insolvency regimes are moving away from
liquidation toward promoting restructuring. Therefore, an integrative approach
concerning all stakeholders is recommended to draft a European legislative pro-
posal to restructure businesses, in particular, at an early stage of ﬁnancial distress.
Although there are multiple reasons that argue for stakeholder involvement, in
Section V, the argument was made that this was not the approach from the start.
The debates on harmonising substantive insolvency law started with a resolution of
the European Parliament in 2011. In the preparation of the Commission Recom-
mendation (2014) on a new approach to business failure and insolvency and the
EIR 2015, several studies were completed. In these efforts, the Commission was
supported not only by extensive studies on the EIR 2000 but also a temporary
group of experts and meetings with national experts.
In 2015, subsequent to the evaluation of the Recommendation, the Commission
published the Action Plan on a CMU and announced a legislative proposal on
harmonising substantive insolvency law. From here on, stakeholders were actively
involved by the Commission. In previous years, it was observed already repeatedly
that substantive insolvency laws of the Member States are widely differing across
Europe. Also, insolvency laws are intertwined with various other ﬁelds of law, in-
cluding securities law, labour law, contract law, company law and tax law. The
Commission initiated a new (temporary) group of experts to assist in the prepara-
tions for the legislative proposal. From April till July 2016, multiple meetings were
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organised for extensive debate with a broad variety of stakeholders on the possibil-
ities for harmonisation. Also, public consultations were conducted to gather in-
sights from the wider public. These efforts have led to ample response from
stakeholders.
In Section VI, it was shown that there are two main sentiments from stake-
holders with regard to harmonisation, which can be derived from the public con-
sultations conducted on the CMU and an effective insolvency framework within
the EU. Member States showed reluctance to substantively harmonise insolvency
laws, general principles are welcomed, but further harmonisation is considered
not yet feasible. At the same time, other stakeholders, including central banks, pen-
sion funds, Member States, business associations, SME representatives, labour
unions and research institutes, are supportive of a minimum framework to rescue
distressed businesses and provide a second chance to honest bankrupt
entrepreneurs.
Finally, in Section VII, this article proposes that the current sentiment of all
stakeholders does not prevent the Commission from furthering approximation of
insolvency frameworks. Before, the Commission experienced similar situations
with diverging perspectives of stakeholders and where different approaches with
soft law were adopted. Firstly, a public consultation prior to the 2016 evaluation
of the Mediation Directive showed that Member States were reluctant to pursue
further harmonisation, whereas other stakeholders, in particular practitioners,
would favour this harmonisation. The Commission decided to recommend the
adoption of best practices and guidelines would be suitable to achieve the desired
improvements by practitioners. Secondly, inspiration could be drawn from the
EIR 2015. In this regulation, Recital 48 allows for European or international orga-
nisations to adopt principles and guidelines to further cross-border insolvency co-
operation and communication of insolvency practitioners and courts. These
examples illustrate how promoting effective European restructuring frameworks
for distressed business may be given shape by means of semi-legislation, even
where stakeholder perspectives are diverging. With guidance from the EU legisla-
tor, there could be room in legislative measures for contributions from
stakeholders.
It can be concluded that stakeholders have become more important for the EU
legislator in designing and executing EU legislation in the area of insolvency and
restructuring. Concerns have been raised regarding undesired involvement of
stakeholders, in particular, commercial market players, in legislative processes.
But at the same time, stakeholders may contribute to prioritising potential themes
for harmonisation based on perceived needs in practice, a focused treatment of the
scope and details of those needs and a higher level of involvement in law making
and its execution. The Commission has, in developing a proposal for a
Restructuring Directive, decided to involve stakeholders right from the start and
in multiple ways. They have been given a prominent role in discussing what a fea-
sible and desirable direction is for a draft legislative proposal. As a result, involve-
ment of stakeholders may lead to better founded legislation.
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